Kronstadt, the rebellion forgotten by many

If you speak to many Trotskyists and mention the K word they will go white in the face and shift uneasy as Kronstadt for them is a difficult one to explain. The workers rebellion of March 1921 stands out as one of the most brutal acts the BOLSHEVIKS Committed in their time in power. For me the Russian Revolution itself is a major inspiration to my political ideas but the Kronstadt rebellion which I brought up once when I was a member of the socialist party was rarely discussed and if it was I was brought to one side and told this act by the BOLSHEVIKS Was necessary to defend the revolution from "outside forces". This seems to be the common line from Trotskyists who try to justify this brutal act on the good sailors and workers who helped in the early days of the revolution who were not happy with the authoritarian nature of the BOLSHEVIKS And their methods of suppression of freedoms. “An understanding of the Russian revolution is vital for any understanding of why the left failed in the 20th century. Yet most discussion amongst revolutionaries never goes beyond the usual argument about the Kronstadt rebellion. The left's present crisis has forced rethinking in some circles but many of us continue to cope with isolation by clinging onto our respective traditions. Anarchists and libertarian communists emphasize the Bolsheviks' authoritarian policies, blaming them for the revolution's failure, while underestimating the difficulties of constructing a new society in an isolated country devastated by civil war. In contrast Trotskyists blame these material conditions exclusively for the revolution's degeneration, dismissing most left-wing criticisms of the Bolsheviks as giving comfort to the right. Bolshevik policies were problematic from the start. In 1917 Lenin argued that, as private capitalism could not develop Russia, a revolutionary state would have to use 'state capitalism' to build the prerequisites for the transition to communism. This approach was always likely to come into conflict with the working class. Then, as the revolution failed to spread outside Russia, the Bolsheviks imposed even more external discipline on workers, effectively abandoning Marx's insistence on "the self-emancipation of the working class". This concept of "self-emancipation" implies that the working class can only create communism by freely making and defending the revolution themselves. So the action of workers taking day-to-day control of every aspect of society is itself the essence of the revolutionary process. Considerable compromises with the ideals of self-emancipation were inevitable in the crippling conditions of the Russian revolution. By October 1917 there were 900 workers' councils or soviets, controlling everything from housing to hospitals. There were also more than 2,000 elected factory committees which were even more powerful because they had been compelled to supervise the factory owners and production. The Bolshevik party was dwarfed by these bodies and was often overtaken by the rapid radicalization of workers. However, unlike the reformist Mensheviks or the peasant oriented Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), it had not joined the repressive Provisional Government; a regime that had totally discredited itself by its failure to maintain living standards, authorise land seizures or provide peace. The openness and flexibility of the Bolshevik party allowed it to express workers' desire for a government of all the soviet parties. On 25 October it organised the overthrow of the Provisional Government and set up a Soviet government headed by Lenin Once in power the overriding concern of the Bolshevik leadership was the revival of industry to overcome a largely feudal crisis-ridden society. To this end they proposed to nationalise the largest monopolies, initially leaving the rest of industry under capitalist ownership combined with both government and workers' control. This was consistent with Lenin's arguments before October that "socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly which is made to serve the interests of the whole people and has to that extent ceased to be capitalist monopoly." He later said, "we recognise only one road - changes from below; we wanted the workers themselves, from below, to draw up the new, basic economic principles." But, like the Second International he came from, Lenin never developed a consistent theory of workers' self-management, tending to only advocate "inspection", "accounting and control" by workers of the decisions of others.” This is very similar to many Trotskyist parties today and their programme is very close if not identical to the original programme Lenin looked to set about putting into place. The term those who fail to learn the lessons from history are doomed to repeat them. So for me whilst being inspired by the early days of the Russian revolution what followed the suppression and the terror does not inspire me and has lead me to re assess my thoughts and political feelings as to how a revolution can be carried out. Kronstadt for me is a chilling tale of a rebellion by workers who were involved in the original revolution in 1917 yet had grown tired of the lack of freedom and democracy that was allowed. They feared the growing tide of suppression by the government. “Trotskyists usually justify the Bolshevik's actions on the grounds that the heroic sailors of 1917 had been replaced by newly recruited peasants, easily influenced by counter-revolutionary ideas. But Evan Mawdsley and Israel Getzler cite Soviet research which shows that three-quarters of all the sailors in Kronstadt in 1921 had probably been there since World War One. It also clearly demonstrates that 90% of the sailors on the two main battleships were drafted before 1918 White exiles had tried to help the mutineers and the main leader of the rebellion, Petrichenko, did join the Whites for a period after the mutiny was suppressed. Still, there is no convincing evidence that the mutineers had any ties to the Whites during the rebellion itself and it appears that no foreign power even attempted to take military advantage of the situation. Moreover Lenin himself said, "There they do not want either the White Guards or our government". So the Bolshevik regime's need to suppress any rebellion calling for democracy was at least as much a factor in its attitude to the sailors as the threat of intervention from abroad. Trotskyists are right to say that a major cause of the degeneration of the revolution was its inability to spread which meant that it was crippled by objective factors such as economic backwardness, isolation and civil war. Nevertheless they are wrong to advocate a rigid determinism, minimising ideological factors. This is especially the case when at every stage of the bureaucratisation of the regime there were vocal critics within the Bolshevik party itself who proposed alternative policies that might have slowed this process. Even if the appalling conditions of the civil war justified their policies then, they cannot excuse the repression both before and after the war. Of course Trotskyists could argue that the civil war and economic collapse started in 1917 so Lenin's attitudes were justified from the beginning. But soviet democracy withstood the crises of 1917 and then expanded sufficiently to make a revolution in October. So it must have had the potential to survive the threats of 1918 better than it did, especially as it was supposedly holding state power. The civil war also cannot be used to excuse the Bolshevik leaders' lack of regret about their use of repression. For instance, although Lenin described the NEP as a 'defeat', at no stage did he describe the suppression of soviet democracy and workers' control in such language. Indeed the Bolsheviks even called their civil war policies "communist" although they were obviously the antithesis of genuine communism. It is easy to criticise with the benefit of hindsight. However there is something very disturbing about the fact that Trotskyists still claim that the Bolsheviks were acting as communists after 1918 when they were clearly acting more as agents of the degeneration of the revolution. Material conditions did limit everything at this time but this includes Lenin and Trotsky's ideas so their applicability eighty years later is surely also severely limited. Effectively many Trotskyists are arguing that, if it is necessary, Marx's insistence on "self-emancipation" and a democratic workers' republic can be postponed provided people like Lenin and Trotsky run the 'workers' state' and raise the red flag for international revolution. Yet for the Bolsheviks to suppress the Russian working class - on behalf of a world working class that has no say in this policy - contradicts any concept of proletarian self-emancipation. Workers will never be inspired by a Marxism that offers the possibility of state subjugation in a 'holding operation' until the whole world has had a revolution. This argument also assumes that Lenin's internationalism could have remained intact while the revolution degenerated all around him. But future writing will show that his internationalism was compromised not long after October. Some Trotskyists do have criticisms of a number of Bolshevik policies, such as the post-war restrictions on soviet democracy. However none of them are willing to stray too far from Trotsky's own reservations which he only really voiced when he had lost power. Their lack of appreciation of what might be valuable in the Bolshevik tradition is shown by the fact that no Trotskyist organisation today allows the range of views that coexisted in the Bolshevik party even during the civil war. Besides, considering the extent of the repression resorted to by Lenin's regime, the priority is not to criticise individual policies but to try and work out how revolutionaries could have avoided getting into this appalling situation in the first place. If the Bolsheviks had respected workers' democracy they may well have lost power. Nevertheless this would have been a gamble, like the October revolution, that they would have been right to take, one that in itself would have restored some of the party's popularity. It would also have had more chance of success than Trotsky's bureaucratic attempts to prevent Stalin's dictatorship. Even if the gamble had failed, the outcome could not have been worse than 'Stalinism', which not only slaughtered millions, but did so in the name of communism and so stifled the prospects for revolution world-wide for the rest of the century. In the end perhaps the most interesting aspect of this whole issue is why so many Marxists who claim to believe in workers' self-emancipation defend a politics that effectively denies it. “ With thanks for quotes and extracts at libcom http://www.libcom.org/library/beyond-kronstadt

Learning the lessons from the other September 11th

While many around the world were paying their respects to the victims of 9/11 the attacks on the twin towers and the terrorist attacks in America in 2001. Many working class people were also paying tribute to the other September the 11th. The 11th of September in 1973 when in Chile in South America a brutal suppression lead to tragedy after a popular socialist government was defeated. IN SEPTEMBER 1970, Salvador Allende was elected President of Chile. His Popular Unity (UP) government - made up of large workers' parties (Socialists, Communists) and smaller middle-class parties - defeated the conservative Christian Democrats (CDs). Hopes were raised of a 'parliamentary road to socialism', tackling capitalism through peaceful, constitutional means. Three years later, these dreams lay in ashes. Militant reported in the issue of 14 September 1973: "After three turbulent years of social crisis and economic chaos, the Popular Unity government ... has been snuffed out under the iron heel of the military. "All the hopes, all the sacrifices of the Chilean workers and poor peasants during this period, have come to nothing. The armed forces have seized power in Chile by a military coup. The capitalists have used their military power to destroy the reforms instituted by the 'Popular Unity' government." These reforms included efforts to raise the living standards of the poorest, to ensure full employment to the workers and land to the peasants. Why were the Chilean people's hopes dashed? For three years, articles in Militant explained how, even in a country known as the "England of Latin America", the ruling capitalist class would not take such attacks on their privileges lightly. Since 1920, Chile's 'constitutional' army had organised nine coups! In February 1972 we warned: "Chilean society teeters on the brink of crisis. The question is posed: will the workers and peasants succeed in guaranteeing the gains of Allende's government, by pressing forward to socialist revolution, or will the reaction strike with ferocious vengeance...?" The Allende government nationalised the huge US-owned copper industry with little compensation to the owners. However large parts of the economy were left untouched, so were the judicial system, the media and vitally, the armed forces. Allende was allowed to take office only if the UP promised to leave the armed forces as they were, with the officer caste left in control and all the privileges of the army tops left intact. Rank and file members of the armed forces were even forbidden the right to join a trade union and freedom of political association. Revolutionary programme CHILE'S RULING class did not move to crush Allende early in his rule. Both they and US imperialism feared an explosive reaction from workers and youth both in Chile and in the rest of Latin America and even in a USA traumatised by Vietnam. But Allende held the masses back from defending their revolution with phrases warning against 'provoking reaction'. "Allende thinks", said Militant in February 1972, that "he can 'neutralise' the generals - the faithful servants of the capitalists, by flattering them and praising their 'Chilean respect for democracy'." Militant stressed that a peaceful transition could only be guaranteed by "a bold revolutionary programme" including setting up "peasant committees to take over the land... A decree on land nationalisation would legalise the accomplished revolutionary fact. "Workers' control of industry... to prevent factory closures. Industry should be nationalised with minimum compensation on the basis of need. Action committees... should be set up by the trade unions to force landlords and traders to reduce prices and rents." Finally, we wrote "A workers' militia, based on the unions, should be set up to defend the workers' gains... Allende should appeal to the army rank and file - the workers in uniform - to set up soldiers' committees. Faced with a powerful movement in the army, the generals would be suspended in mid-air." Militant explained how Chile's ruling class "could not be overwhelmed by using its own state", that "It was necessary to raise the workers' organisations, most developed in the form of Soviets (workers' and peasants' committees) to state power, completely paralysing and dismantling the old state in the process." The ruling class used their economic control to sabotage the economy and build opposition amongst small businesses such as the private lorry owners. Then, Militant said: "after a sufficient period of 'anarchy' the generals will be able to step forward as the 'saviours' of the country". We argued that "only the working class, fighting on a clear socialist programme, can really defend the interests of the small proprietors... grant cheap credit to the small farmers, the shopkeepers... to develop their businesses until voluntarily they would agree to form co-operative enterprises, eventually merging with state industry when they could see this path would lead to a better standard of life for them." Sowing illusions BY JUNE 1973 the armed forces were disarming workers, searching for arms in the workers' districts and factories and taking action against sailors affected by revolutionary propaganda. That month the counter-revolution attempted a premature coup. Militant reported: "The Chilean bosses and their blood-brothers in the army general staff understand fully that premature attempts at a coup would, without doubt, provoke a mass uprising which would endanger the whole system..." As an article in The Guardian said "If so far the Chilean army has held back, the explanation is... not any peculiar national tradition, but the formidable strength now acquired by the labour movement". Militant commented: "This is the explanation for the abject failure of the coup attempt... on 29 June. It was suppressed by 'loyal units' of the army within two and a half hours - just in time. For as news of the coup spread, thousands of workers struck, occupied their factories and, leaving armed pickets on the gates, marched on the Presidential Palace. "Here was a movement which could have put an end once and for all to the threat of reactionary tyranny. But Allende appealed for a return to work and riot police were sent in to break up the milling crowds. Only this cowardice, this treachery, this total lack of perspective, enabled the bosses to gasp for breath once more. "Only the blocking of the movement of the masses as a result of this betrayal emboldened the road hauliers enough to raise their heads in defiance of the UP! "Even then, the magnificent Chilean workers called a 24-hour general strike on 9 August to ... support the UP against the "road hauliers' blackmail". There is no shortage of courage or willingness to fight. What is lacking is leadership." Appeal Militant finished this article with an appeal to the "left wing, especially the Socialist youth" to "fight for committees of action for the defence of the rights of the workers and the defence of the revolution to be set up in every factory, workers' district, and armed forces." These forces, we said, should "be linked locally, in the districts and nationally together with all workers' organisations to provide the necessary framework for pushing forward the revolution and defeating the counter-revolutionary plots of reaction." We ended by demanding: "Arm the workers! Expel the capitalist ministers, civilian and military, from the UP government. For a socialist Chile!" However the UP leaders' response to this coup threat was to bring three military chiefs and the commander of the Federal Police into the Cabinet. Just weeks later, the generals and commanders were using their state forces to crush Allende's government and end the reforms. On 9 September 1973, just two days before the coup, half a million workers marched past Allende on the balcony of the presidential palace - most of them were demanding arms to defend the gains of 1970-73. But tragically, as Militant said after the coup, Allende and his government "failed to organise workers' councils of action and to arm the workers and appeal to the rank and file soldiers, sailors and airmen to set up committees." They gave "support to the reactionary officers, Generals and Admirals of the armed forces. "Allende sowed illusions in the 'neutrality' of the army caste and the acceptance by the capitalists of the Chilean constitution. This was the fatal error of policy for which the workers and peasants of Chile are paying in blood and suffering." The coup led by General Pinochet saved capitalism in Chile by plunging the workers, peasantry and middle class into 17 years of dictatorship, murdering at least 5,000 political opponents and torturing hundreds of thousands more. Future generations of working-class revolutionaries must learn the lessons of Chile 1970-73. With extracts taken from the Militant and the socialist.